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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to defend United States intervention in states that
violate international human rights law. To explain the modem framework
behind the legal justifications for intervention, it is necessary to review the
historical development of international human rights law, the concept of
sovereignty, and the continuing conflict between the two principles.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Definition
It has been customary to call humanitarian law that considerable
portion of international public law that owes its inspiration to a feeling for
humanity and that is centered on the protection of the individual.' The
concept of an international law of human rights reflects a general
acceptance that how a state treats individual human beings is not always
the state's business alone and, therefore, not exclusively within its
domestic jurisdiction, but is a matter of international concern.2
B. Origins
The development of human rights law emanates from the ancient
distinction between the morality of the decision to instigate war and the
morality of the means of waging that war.3 The concept has evolved from
centuries of warfare in which combatants (states) have increasingly turned
against civilian populations as a means of waging war or of countering
internal conflicts. As the "staggering cruelty practiced in the wars of the
last 150 years continually prodded the human conscience, the law has been
evolved to improve its protection for civilians and combatants." The
evolution of this concept derives from a split in the perception of the
1. JEAN PICTET, HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 11
(1975).
2. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
701 cmt. a (1987).
3. See generally, Laura Lopez, Uncivil Wars: The Challenge of Applying International
Humanitarian Law to Internal Armed Conflicts, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 916, 918 (1994).
4. Id. at 918. See also, JUDITH G. GARDAN, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 124 (1993).
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underlying activity of conflict.' The term jus ad bellum refers to the
threshold question of whether the reasons for fighting a war in the first
place are just, while jus in bello refers to whether the war is being fought
justly or unjustly. International human rights law disregards the sovereign
state's prerogative to engage in warfare and focuses mainly on the jus in
bello. As will be discussed, the essential parameters of human rights law
are sometimes allegedly breached when the promotion of jus in bello
necessarily encroaches upon the state's claim of sovereignty in its jus ad
belium.7
C. Codification of International Human Rights Law
The intentional systematic employment of genocide, both within
and without the borders of Nazi Germany, generally awakened states and
jurists to the need for a more concrete establishment of international
human rights law. The experience of World War II resulted in the
expansion and codification of the laws of war in the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.9 The Conventions provide for treatment of the sick
and wounded (both in the armed forces and at sea); for treatment of
prisoners of war; and for protection of civilian persons in time of war.9
Despite the broad application of these Conventions, there remained a
strong impediment to the protection of international human rights within
the domestic jurisdiction of individual states since almost all of the
provisions applied only to international wars.'0 Regardless of the growing
idea that international human rights law should permeate beyond the
borders of sovereign states, the traditional notion of state sovereignty was
still powerful at the drafting in 1949. Hence, protection of the sovereignty
concept still dominated this codification of international human rights law,
and prevented a more substantially enforceable protection of domestic
human rights abuses.
5. Lopez, supra note 3, at 918.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 921.
9. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF AUG. 12,
1949 (photo. reprint 1981) [hereinafter GENEVA CONVENTIONS].
10. Lopez, supra note 3, at 924 (stating that the Geneva Convention describes international
war as "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties.") Id.
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Another codification attempt occurred following World War II in
the form of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Germany."
As a result of the proceedings, the Geneva Conventions of 1949
incorporated criminal prosecution as an essential enforcement mechanism
of both domestic and international human rights abuses. Violations of the
Protocols of the Geneva Conventions during international conflicts were
designated as grave breaches, which signatory states were required to
punish.' 2 Again, the problem in applying the Nuremberg Charter through
the Geneva Conventions, is that article 2 of each of the four Conventions
applies the provisions only to "all cases of declared war ... between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties." 3
A further codification of international human rights, with
subsequently much greater enforcement capability than found in the
Geneva Conventions, is in the United Nations Charter (U.N. Charter)
which states that "[tihe purposes of the United Nations is [t]o achieve
international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms
for all . . . . "1 Unlike the failed Covenant of the League of Nations,
human rights were woven in as an important, indeed a guiding thread,
throughout the fabric of the U.N. Charter.', The enforcement of
applicable U.N. Charter provisions and the prior codifications of
international human rights law will be addressed following discussion of
the concept of sovereignty and its conflict with international human rights
law. A review of this continuing legal dialectic is essential before
demonstrating how sovereignty is steadily losing its status as the bedrock
of public international law to international human rights.
III. SOVEREIGNTY
A. Definition
Sovereignty is the principle that "except as limited by international
law or treaty, each state is the master of its own territory . . ." and that
11. See CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, The London Agreement,
Aug. 8, 1945, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 420-28 (1949) [hereinafter
NUREMBERG CHARTER].
12. Lopez, supra note 3, at 922.
13. GENEVA CONVENTIONS supra note 9, at 23.
14. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
15. JAN MARTENSON, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, A
COMMENTARY 18 (Asbiorn Eide et al. eds. 1992).
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"[e]ach sovereign state can only be legally bound by those commitments it
willingly makes to other sovereign states, and by those few principles
which are viewed as binding on all states."16 Sovereignty has traditionally
been viewed as an absolute power that may be wielded by the sovereign,
within its own territorial jurisdiction. Until modem times,'7 the
sovereignty principle has implied that a state is answerable to no other
entity but itself when dispensing authority within its own borders or when
engaging in warfare with other sovereign states.,8
B. The Historical Development of the Sovereignty Principle
Despite the role that sovereignty has traditionally played in
preserving the notion of unnaccountability for a state's internal affairs,
there is another side to the sovereignty coin. States have always been
limited in the legitimacy of their sovereign status by their reciprocal
respect for the concept. 9 In other words, an act by a state in contravention
of a legitimate agreement or treaty, could result in other states' collective
retaliatory disregard of that outlaw state's sovereign status.2 Such
retaliatory disregard historically resulted in effects ranging from
disenchanted states becoming reluctant to enter trade agreements and
treaties with the outlaw state, to sanctions, and to outright hostility.
The notion that a state's sovereignty is dependent upon its respect
for the sovereignty of other states has customarily included the
16. Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards A People-
Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L. L. & POL.'Y 1, 1 (1993).
17. Here the phrase modem times refers generally to the period following World War II,
with the subsequent creation of international human rights treaties such as the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the United Nations
Charter.
18. See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 206(b) (1987).
19. Early in 1988, the United States Defense Department became aware of a ship
approaching the Gulf with a load of Chinese-made Silkworm missiles en route to Iran.
• . the Defense Department ... argued for permission to interdict the delivery. The
State Department, however, countered that such a seizure on the high seas, under
universally recognized rules of war and neutrality, would constitute ... an act of war
against Iran . . . the delivery ship with its cargo of missiles was allowed to pass.
Deference to systemic rules had won out over tactical advantage.
THOMAS M. FRANCE, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 3 (1990).
20. Report of the Commission Appointed Under Article 26 of the Constitution of the ILO
to Examine the Complaints Concerning the Observance by Greece of Human Rights Conventions,
cited in B. G. Ramcharan, Washington College of Law Conference, The Role of International
Bodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 99, 106 (1983). (Claiming that a state
cannot use its sovereignty to brush aside performance of an obligation under international law).
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maintenance of respect for agreements entered'into with other sovereign
states. 21 Whether the agreement is a trade pact or a military alliance, is a
voluntary cession by the contracting states of a portion of absolute
authority to determine its own actions. Thus, while a sovereign state has
the customary ability to act as it will, it may also agree to waive its
absolute ability to exercise that will. The notion of a state's ability to waive
sovereignty and to be bound by that waiver has been a pervading theme
throughout the attempts to codify the sovereignty principle in modern
times.
C. Recognition of Sovereignty in the Codification of International
Human Rights Law
Even in modem times, the codification of human rights law would
not have been possible without the incorporation of the sovereignty
principle into provisions of the various treaties and conventions following
World War II. Without this inclusion, states would have been extremely
reluctant to enter into binding agreements, since there would be no
definable boundary as to how much of a state's sovereignty could be ceded
to the tenets of the agreement. Independent states that were subject to
colonialization in the past have been particularly fearful of entering into
international agreements that even hint at restrictions upon their
sovereignty .22
The four Geneva Conventions attempted to cut through the
sovereignty barrier. Article 3, which is common to all four Conventions,
applies in the case of an armed conflict not of "an international
character."2 3  It prohibits "violence to life and person, the taking of
hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the denial of judicial
guarantees .... "24 On its surface, this indicates an intention by the
drafters, and subsequent compliance by the state signatories, to bypass
sovereignty in applying the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions
within the sovereign states themselves. However, interest in the protection
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
206, cmt. e (1987). "[S]tatus as a legal person ... to make contracts and enter into international
agreements .... " Id. at (b).
22. During the first few decades after World War II, the movement away from
sovereignty often was not perceptible. Indeed, in the wake of decolonization, the role
of sovereignty in international law appeared strengthened by . . . their aggressive
assertion of . . . [sovereignty by new nation-states]. These developments, however,
masked a slow but steady diminution in the realities of sovereign power ....
Grossman and Bradlow, supra note 16, at 6.
23. GENEVA CONVENTIONS, supra note 9, art. 3 at 24, 52, 75, 154 (1949).
24. GENEVA CONVENTIONS, cited in Lopez supra note 3, at 924.
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of sovereignty has permeated the codification.2 As a result, no specific
enforcement procedure was included. Concern for the preservation of
sovereignty seems to have prevailed over internal application of
international human rights law in the initial drafting of the Geneva
Conventions.
The U.N. Charter does not contain a specific definition of
sovereignty, but does continue to adhere to the historical principle of
sovereignty."6 There is, however, an important caveat to the U.N.
Charter's recognition of this principle. Article 2, paragraph 7 of the
Charter refers to the U.N.'s lack of authority to intervene in a states
domestic affairs, but also reads that "this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII."2 By becoming
signatories adhering to the Charter's provisions, member states have
demonstrated a commitment to waive sovereignty under the purview of
Chapter VII.2 For the first time, state parties to an organization or treaty,
are denied the sovereignty cloak as a defense to nonconformity with an
agreement's provisions.
IV. VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CREATES
AN IMPLIED WAIVER OF SOVEREIGNTY BY THE VIOLATING STATE
A. Modern Examples of Sovereignty Prevailing Over International
Human Rights Law
There now seems to exist a paradigm that the once impregnable
barrier of sovereignty can now become quite malleable in the face of
persistent international human rights law violations. Historic examples of
scenarios where nations such as the United States have foregone
intervention, despite what could be argued as an implied waiver of
25. Id. "Although the Geneva Conventions generally contain extensive provisions for the
enforcement and implementation of their norms in an international context, in an internal conflict
article 3 provides only that the ICRC may offer its services to the parties, an offer that may be
refused." Id.
26. (4) All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations ....
(7) Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state
or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures
under Chapter VII U.N. Charter.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, §§ 4, 7 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at art. 2, § 7.
28. See generally, U.N. CHARTER art. 2, § 7.
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sovereignty, help to convey the importance in acting when a violating
state's veil of sovereignty can be pierced.
A glaring example of a foregone but necessary intervention,
occurred during the Khmer Rouge seizure of Cambodia. 29 The rampant
massacres did not cease until actual intervention in 1979 by the unlikely
savior of the occupying forces from Vietnam 0 Despite international
condemnation of Cambodias human rights abuses, the United States lacked
the means or political will to intervene. China supported the regime in
Cambodia, and the United States likely felt itself in no position to become
embroiled in another conflict in Southeast Asia. However, the fact that
intervention by other states did not occur prior to Vietnam's role is even
less dubious than the tragic reality that subsequent accountability has not
been forthcoming. 3'
Although international politics and lack of military means played
roles in denying United States intervention, the tragedy of Cambodia
demonstrates two undeniable developments. First, that intervention, even
by a brutal totalitarian power, brought the Khmer Rouge genocide to a
near halt. Second, Vietnam's use of the Pol Pot regime's human rights
violations (even as an unsuccessful pretextual argument for intervention)
demonstrates the growing recognition by states that the sovereignty barrier
can potentially be pierced by way of claiming persistent international
human rights violations . 2
Another example of sovereignty prevailing over intervention,
despite an implied waiver of sovereignty based on human rights abuses, is
the Castro regime in Cuba. Since Fidel Castro seized power in 1959, his
regime has maintained authority through politically-motivated
29. Barbara Crossette, Before Rwanda, Before Bosnia; Waiting for Justice in Cambodia,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1996, at §§ 4, 5.
[Fjrom April 17, 1975, until January 7, 1979 . . . the Khmer Rouge . . . waged a
manic campaign to ... start over as an ethnically pure Khmer nation purged not only
of its minorities but also of its professional middle class ... it was estimated that up to
one million Cambodians, in a population of about 7.5 million, died. Id.
30. See generally 1979 U.N.Y.B. 271, 272, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. (regarding how
Vietnam dubiously claimed the intervention was initiated on behalf of persistent human rights
violations).
31. Crossette, supra note 29, at 5 (stating that "[tlhe International Criminal Tribunal
system is already overstretched and underfinanced in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda"). Id.
32. See Questions Concerning Asia; Democratic Kampuchea and Vietnam, 1979 U.N.Y.B.
271, 272, U.N. Sales No. E.82.I.1. "[V]ietnam transmitted a declaration . . . . [tihese
documents charged that . . . Pol Pot . . . had usurped power, transformed the revolutionary
forces into mercenaries for the Chinese authorities, and threatened the Kampuchean people with
extermination... and called for support ... from all governments and national and international
organizations." Id.
902 [Vol. 3:895
Meyers
imprisonment, torture, execution, and through repression of emigration,
the media, and any political dissent." The United Nations General
Assembly (U.N.G.A.), in addition to its broad condemnation of the type of
violations orchestrated by the Castro regime, 3' has specifically singled out
Cuba's flagrant disregard for international human rights law."
The U.N.'s condemnation of Cuba's human rights violations
provides a likely basis for arguing an implied waiver of sovereignty since
Cuba is a signatory to the U.N. Charter. Although the Security Council
has not authorized such an intervention, Cuba's violations render its
sovereignty an incapable defense were the United States to intervene
unilaterally on behalf of international human rights law. Despite the
possibility of claiming Cuba's implied waiver of sovereignty, political and
economic factors commit the United States to a policy of continued
recognition of Cuba's sovereignty.
Two political factors have smothered past arguments and efforts at
intervention. First, in 1962, the United States promised never to invade
Cuba in exchange for removal of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missles
(ICBMs) during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is now debatable whether this
foreign policy obligation was inherited by Russia following the demise of
the Soviet Union. Second, diplomatic and trade tension would likely result
from certain Organization of American States (OAS) member states that
fear potential future intervention based on their own international human
rights violations. 6 However, recent criminal acts of this outlaw regime,
such as the shooting down of civilian aircraft in international airspace,
33. See generally, Situation of Human Rights in Cuba; Report of the 3rd Committee. G.A.
Res. 50/198, U.N. Doc. A/50/635/add.3 (1996).
34. Id.
35. (20) The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has repeatedly reported
on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba and has taken the extraordinary
step of appointing a Special Rapporteur ....
(21) The Government of Cuba has consistently refused access to the Special Rapporteur
and formally expressed its decision not to implement so much as one comma of the
United Nations Resolutions appointing the Rapporteur ....
(22) The United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 1992/70 ... Resolution
1993/48/142 ... and Resolution 1994/49/544 ... referencing the Special Rapporteur's
reports to the United Nations and condemning violations of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Cuba.
H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995).
36. See generally, Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy
in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 393, 402 (1994).
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have finally begun to task the patience of United States lawmakers
reluctance at some form of intervention.,,
From the end of World War II through the collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991, the prolonged proxy wars of the struggle between the
democratic and communist blocs often masked gross human rights
violations.38 Even when atrocities received international attention and
subsequent condemnation, intervention often carried with it the threat of
potential escalation among the major powers. The geo-political
consequences inherent in this Cold War paradigm prevented intervention
even when the United States possessed sufficient military capability and
could have argued that the violating state had impliedly waived its
sovereign status on the basis of international human rights violations.
The Cold War and its bloody proxy battles, such as Nicaragua and
others, now seem a past period. With the strategic and political restraints
of the Cold War, no longer a near total albatross, a new paradigm of
foreign policy is foreseeable. For instance, the United States can now
intervene in more places where it perceives there has been an implied
waiver of sovereignty, without fearing retaliation from a now non-existent
Communist bloc. A necessary first step, however, is for other states to
recognize that the sovereignty principle is no longer a viable cloak for
international human rights abuses. This new interpretation is significantly
aided by the modern transformation of the very meaning of the phrase,
sovereignty.
B. The Traditional Meaning of Sovereignty is No Longer Viable
The traditional notion of sovereignty as an inviolable, impenetrable
barrier that neatly defines a nation's physical and political boundaries is
now an outdated concept. One author states that:
[T]he Second World War provided members of the
international community with a powerful and tragic lesson
in the dangers inherent in an international legal order
based on a notion of absolute sovereignty. The
37. H.R. 927, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). The Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1995. "A Bill to seek international sanctions against the Castro
government in Cuba, to plan support of a transition government leading to a democratically
elected government in Cuba ... and for other purposes." Id. This controversial Bill penalizes
foreign companies that do business with Cuba. Following the downing of Brothers to the Rescue
aircraft on February 24, 1996, the Bill sailed through Congress, and was subsequently signed into
law by President Clinton. See George Rodrique, House Oks Tighter Cuba Sanctions; Clinton
Expected to Sign Bill, WASH. BUREAU OF THE DALLAS'MORNING NEWS, Mar. 7, 1996, at IlA.
38. See Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 9.
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contemporary international order severely limited the
ability of the international community to intervene in the
internal affairs of sovereign states. This lesson provided
the impetus for the creation of international organizations.
. .given some ability to compel member states to comply
with their rules and decisions.39
In addition to the voluntary cession of a portion of a state's
sovereignty to international organizations, treaties, and agreements, there
has been a de facto demographic alteration in the historical definition of
sovereignty. Borders are becoming less rigid. Technology is leading to a
new international consciousness,'0 and modem United States military
capability, as well as that of other states, is becoming more efficiently
designed for rapid intervention and nation-building missions.
Borders between states can no longer simply be maintained at just
physical checkpoints. Communications technology has led to the rapid
dissemination of information in an almost uncontrollable torrent throughout
the globe." The ability of individual states to control the spread of
information, and effectively regulate communication between individuals
or organizations within and without their borders, significantly undermines
the previously established parameters of a states authority. In addition, the
limitless dissemination and communication to all points on the globe
creates a sense of international community that did not exist during the
formative centuries of the sovereignty principle.' 2
Besides the limits imposed on sovereignty by communications
technology, economic interdependence has also served to erode the
sovereignty principle. The Maastricht Treaty, signed by the member states
of the European Community, was designed to form a super state out of a
once solely economic union.4 3 Of all the post-World War II treaties, this
has been the most ambitious with its near complete cession of sovereignty
by its member states, both in foreign and domestic affairs." In response to
the potential trading juggernaut of the European Union, the United States
Congress passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
39. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 2-4.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 11. "Human rights and other social activists can use facsimiles and E-mail to
inform the world of developments in their countries." Id.
42. Id. at 12.
43. Europe after Maastricht; Not the Union They Meant, 329 ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 1993,
at 56.
44. Id.
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1993.4- Despite domestic pressure against the treaty for fear of an exodus
of United States industry and jobs to Mexico, the Congress recognized that
economic strength cannot be sustained from within a state's own borders
alone.- As a result of NAFTA, the level of trade has increased throughout
Canada, the United States, and Mexico. In fact, Congress is now
considering an expansion of NAFTA to other states in the western
hemisphere. Comprehensive trade agreements have often been historical
predecessors to the loosening of borders and stronger political ties between
states."
Sovereignty as a feasible defense to legitimate intervention should
not be limited by the reality that the majority of current conflicts are civil
in nature.4 9  If a state is violating the international human rights of its
citizens, and the facts are known to the outside world, it seems a fallacy
for the violating government to claim that its sovereignty has been violated
upon legitimate intervention.10
These factors demonstrate that the sovereignty principle,
embedded even in modem codifications,' is no longer viable as a defense
to legitimate intervention based on that state's international human rights
45. North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32
I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
46. See David S. Broder & Michael Weisskopf, Business Prospered in Democratic-Led
103rd Congress, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1994, at Al, cited in G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism
and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J.
829, 883 n.259 (1995).
47. Broder & Weisskoph, supra note 46, at 883.
48. Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification, 50 MD. L. REV. 475,
478 (1991). The Germanic Confederation in 1871 ". . . was more in the nature of a treaty
community than any sort of real political union. But it and the early nineteenth century Customs
Union were steps in that direction." Id.
WTO dispute resolution decisions will automatically come into force as a matter of
international law in virtually every case. The new judges of international trade thus
have jurisdiction to rule that governments must amend or repeal domestic laws that are
inconsistent with world trade norms or risk imposition of trade sanctions.
Shell, supra note 46, at 832.
49. Ernie Regehr, Warfare's New Face; Civil War has Become the Norm in Warfare, 41
WORLD PRESS REV. 14 (1994). "All three dozen wars raging in the world today are fights
within single states - none is a fight between states .... They are ... a consequence of failed
states .... " Id. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Recent Development: Joining Forces: United Nations
and Regional Peacekeeping--Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129 (1995). "[Pliaces
such as Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Liberia . . . reflect . . .war in today's world - internal
conflicts fueled by political, ethnic, religious, and economic antagonisms no longer contained by
Cold War politics." Id.
50. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 1.
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, § 7.
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violations. If a state commits human rights violations on a persistent basis,
these acts are not likely to go unnoticed by the general population of that
state. Unlike the time of Nazi Germany, human rights violations
committed virtually anywhere in the post-Cold War world cannot go
unnoticed for long, even if witnessed by only a few.12 Communications
technology and the reach of the global media are simply too pervasive and
unregulated to be thoroughly silenced by any single state." This spread of
global awareness, coupled with the proliferation of massive trade pacts and
voluntary cessions of sovereignty, are indicative of a new international
consciousness" that has reduced the once formidable principle of
sovereignty into a more malleable concept.
C. A State's Implied Waiver of Sovereignty
A state has impliedly waived its sovereignty when it is no longer in
compliance with international human rights law. International human
rights law applies to all states as a universal principle of jus cogens,
regardless of whether a particular state is a non-signatory to such treaties
and agreements.1
When a state commits human rights abuses against nationals of
another state, or against its own population, it has waived its sovereignty
specifically under the Nuremberg Charter& and the United Nations
Genocide Convention."' The Nuremberg proceedings were begun to bring
the Nazi leaders and their subordinates to justice.-8 Nuremberg was key in
52. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12. See also Donatella Lorch, Burundi After
Mutiny; Horror Stories Everywhere, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1993, at 3. "Even though all
communication lines were cut, loyal ministers, using newly bought cellular phones, managed to
mobilize Burundians through Rwandan radio broadcasts." Id.
53. Grossman & Bradlow, supra note 16, at 12.
54. Nowrojee, supra note 49, at 129. "The slow, but evident, erosion of an absolute
position on sovereignty is leading to an emerging right, and perhaps even duty, for states to
intervene on humanitarian grounds." Id.
55. See MARTENSON, supra note 15, at 20. "The spirit and philosophy of the UDHR
[Universal Declaration of Human Rights] . . . not exclusive of one group or another but aims at
the protection of the human rights of every person." Id. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6. "The
organization shall ensure that states which are not members of the United Nations act in
accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international
peace and security." Id.
56. See NUREMBERG CHARTER, supra note 11.
57. See generally, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF
GENOCIDE, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., EXEC. REP. 99-2, (1985).
58. Lopez, supra note 3, at 922. "The establishment of an International Military Tribunal.
introduced criminality, albeit retroactively, into humanitarian law for the first time." Id.
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that it was designed to recognize that human rights abuses committed even
within a sovereign's domestic arena, were nonetheless criminal acts.
Seizing upon the invaluable precedent of Nuremberg as a tool to penetrate
the sovereignty veil, the U.N.G.A. adopted the fundamental principles of
Nuremberg in the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948.19 The
Convention is but one important, specific example of the codification of
this modem legal philosophy of accountability. It has come full circle
from its inception at Nuremberg to the recently created International
Criminal Tribunal for crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia. 6
The U.N. Genocide Convention and the principles established at
Nuremberg do not provide for a specific preemptive enforcement
provision. However, they do lay a framework for establishing the
illegitimacy of a violating state's sovereignty defense, and the legitimacy
of another state's preemptive intervention. If the community of nations
provides for international military tribunals to punish offenders within a
violating state, it is reasonable to infer that preemptive action is even more
legitimate and desirable to prevent the offenses. The question remaining
should be not whether actual enforcement should occur, but how will it
occur?
V. AUTHORIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES TO ENFORCE
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. United States Multilateral Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law
Following the inception of the U.N., Congress committed the
United States to its multilateral goals and service through enactment of the
United Nations Participation Act (UNPA) of 1945 .61 As a significant
portion of its commitment, the United States has provided massive funding
and military support, in accordance with Article 43 of the U.N. Charter.6 2
59. Henry T. King, Jr., Nuremberg and Sovereignty, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 135,
136 (1996). "[N]uremberg penetrated the veil of national sovereignty to recognize individuals as
having rights independent of nation-state recognition . . . . The United Nations Genocide
Convention was designed to secure adherence to the international human rights recognized at
Nuremberg. . . ." Id.
60. Resolution 827, S/Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. (1993) (establishing an
International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia by vote of the Security Council).
61. United Nations Participation Act, Pub. L. No. 264, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (1945)
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287 (1958)), [hereinafter UNPA], cited in Gregory L.
Naarden, U.N. Intervention after the Cold War: Political Will and the United States, 29 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 231, 236 (1994). "The UNPA outlined the character of the United States' participation
in the UN's system of collective security." Id.
62. Id.
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Congress authorized the President to commit armed forces, facilities, or
assistance, but subject to congressional approval of a special agreement
with the U.N. 6 This was probably an attempt by Congress to limit the
President's ability to commit forces under a U.N. mandate without
congressional approval. As subsequently observed during the Cold War,
congressional power to restrict executive deployment of armed forces
atrophied due to the rapidity in which conflicts erupted versus the slow
process of congressional hearings and votes.
The effectiveness of congressional control of the President's
deployment power under UNPA eroded significantly by the Korean
conflict in 1950. After the U.N. Security Council authorized U.N.
member states to counter North Korean aggression," President Truman
deployed United States troops without waiting for Congress to approve a
special agreement with the U.N. President Truman merely sidestepped the
constitutional question of executive action requiring congressional approval
by "not referring to the conflict as a war." 5 Today, a debate continues in
Congress over whether the United States military should continue to play a
role in peacekeeping operations. House and Senate Republicans argue that
the United States spends a disproportionate amount on peacekeeping; that
American peacekeepers are prominent targets for extremist groups abroad;
and that generally the United Staes is better off withdrawing into the quiet
nest of isolationism."
However, it is vital for international human rights law that the
United States remain the military backbone of U.N. peacekeeping
operations. Withdrawal of United States military and financial support
would set back enforcement of international human rights law to its
nonexistent position prior to Nuremberg. Although Congress may choose
to abrogate its obligations under the U.N. Charter,67 the international
obligation would continue based on its original adherence to the Charter.
Outlaw regimes and fanatical extremist groups could interpret United
63. U.N. CHARTER art. 43. "All members . . . undertake to make available to the
Security Council .... in accordance with a special agreement ... armed forces, assistance, and
facilities .... ." Id.
64. Naarden, supra note 61, at 236-7.
65. S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1511 (1950),
quoted in Naarden, supra note 61, at 241 (regarding Security Council authorization for U.N.
member states to repel North Korean aggression).
66. See Ruth Wedgewood, Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, & Peacebuilding: The Role of
the United Nations in Global Conflict: The Historical Evolution of the United Nations in Global
Conflict: Creating, Defining, & Expanding the Role of the United Nations: The Evolution of
United Nations Peacekeeping, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 638 (1995).
67. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43.
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States intransigence as meaning they have free reign to commit
unnaccountable acts of terrorism and genocide.
Congressional Republicans may claim there is no need to provide
troops and military aid to U.N. peacekeeping operations, and that other
nations troops are more expendable. However, with the end of the Cold
War, the role played by U.N. authorized deployments has changed from a
primarily peacekeeping role, to one of peacemaking. 6  Rampant human
rights abuses now tend to occur within states embroiled in civil wars (the
former Yugoslavia); in territories where government has simply ceased to
exist (Somalia); and where juntas have seized power illegally (Haiti). The
function of all committed U.N. member states armed forces is no longer
just peacekeeping. They must be ready to meet the need for rapid
deployment and potentially prolonged nation-building missions, in what is
essentially a restorative occupation of peacemaking.
The U.N. itself lacks the military, intelligence, and
communications technology necessary for low-risk, rapid intervention. 69
Instead, the U.N. must rely on the military contribution from its member
states.70 The United States has the most efficient capability for complex,
rapid intervention designed to minimize bloodshed and maximize success.'"
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States military has been ordered
to steadily refocus strategy towards smaller scale, regional conflicts.12
68. Naarden, supra note 61, at 242. See also Wedgewood, supra note 66, at 635 (stating
that "[i]n Somalia, and in elements of the Yugoslav operation, the Security Council authorized
peace keepers to operate even without the consent of the parties, under Chapter VII enforcement
authority").
69. Wedgewood, supra note 66, at 636.
The United Nations lacks real-time intelligence . . . and lacks satellite phones to
communicate straight to the field. For example, in the Rwanda emergency, Secretary
Boutros-Ghali had no direct link to the head of UNAMIR troops. The U.N.
Department of Peacekeeping Operations was never set up to be a military command
center. Id.
70. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH. Vol. 6, No. 5, (Aug.
28, 1995). Absolute cost to the United States remains a small portion of its national security
expenses, a far cheaper choice than taking an isolationist stance until forced to confront crises
after they have spread to directly threaten United States interests. See Wedgewood, supra note
66, at 636. "There is now a sense that intervention . . . must be contracted out to a coalition.
who are militarily able." Id.
71. TIM RIPLEY, MODERN UNITED STATES ARMY 6 (1992). "United States military
planners now work on the basis of a forward presence to be reinforced in a crisis by rapidly
deployed forces from the continental United States." Id.
72. Id. at 13. "United States army chiefs have stated that small, mobile and highly trained
light forces will be of increasing importance in a world where low-level regional conflicts are
likely to be the most prevalent form of warfare." Id.
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This effort at United States military adjustment has already borne
results for the enforcement of international human rights law. Where the
U.N. Security Council has recognized the need for intervention,
sovereignty has been pierced, and the initial rapid deployment of United
States peacemaking forces has resulted in mostly successful transitions to
the U.N.'s peacekeeping authority. 3
One notable failure, however, occurred in Somalia. The problem
resulted not from a flaw in the goals of intervention, but in the confused
chain of command. 4 In fact, the initial success of the Somalia intervention
in providing food, relief, and protecting the population against factional
violence, demonstrates the need for the United States armed forces to be
the spearhead of any multilateral intervention, and for the maintenance of a
unified chain of command.
Congressional budget trimming on future intervention and funding
for human rights operations can only harm the growing trend of
multilateral action in dealing with international human rights abuses. If
multilateral consensus dwindles, customary international law could revert
back to the old pure sovereignty defense. Then, international human rights
law could potentially evaporate into an extinct legal concept.
B. United States Unilateral Enforcement of International Human
Rights Law
Multilateral intervention is not always feasible in certain
circumstances. Despite a desire by the United States to take collective
action," it is sometimes necessary for the United States, or other states, to
act unilaterally to enforce international human rights law. The most
succinct example of the need for unilateral action can occur when a
Permanent Security Council member state vetoes a resolution for
73. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH, supra note 70, at 662.
Recent peacekeeping successes include Mozambique, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Namibia, all
countries where the U.N. helped bring long, bloody conflicts to an end and then assisted in the
establishment of more democratic and stable governments. Id.
74. United States military participation in United Nations-authorized Peacekeeping
Operations: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Airland Force of the Comm. on Armed
Sev., 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of John R. Bolton on May 3, 1995).
After the point of effective transition of responsibility from the United States-led
Unified Task Force ("UNIFAF") to the second U.N. operation ... there were really
separate chains of command . . . . Moreover the mission of the United States forces
(and the U.N. force generally) was not well defined, positioning them somewhere
between traditional peace keepers and peace enforcers. Id.
75. See BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH, supra note 70, at 660.
Burden sharing of funding and military force, spreads the sometimes expensive cost among
participating states. Id.
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intervention.76 In the wake of the Cold War, the threat of the veto power
used against United States interests has been minimized since Russia is for
the moment more willing to accommodate United States interests in its
quest to maintain loan guarantees. China frequently abstains in what may
be an effort to ensure continuation of its most favored-nation trading status
with the United States. However, the current geo-political situation is not
frozen indefinitely. Elections, coups, and changes in strategic interests, all
can play a role in the unpredictable future of global politics and
subsequently U.N. Security Council voting.
Since the United States favors multilateral action, if unilateral
intervention is deemed necessary for whatever reason, the United States
can attempt a subsequent ratification by the U.N. 77  The Somalia
intervention 7 demonstrates United States eagerness to obtain subsequent
ratification for unilateral action. The United States, however, has not
always been dissuaded from unilateral action in its enforcement of
international human rights law when it perceives its interests as paramount
to international obligations.
One argument supporting unilateral action is that, despite a bias
towards the maintenance of sovereignty (except at the behest of the U.N.
Security Council under Chapter VII), the U.N. Charter, itself, supports
unilateral action when necessary. Article 2(4) of the Charter requires
member states to refrain from infringement on another state's sovereignty,
yet "[a]rticles 55 and 56 ... [require] each U.N. member to take joint and
separate action to insure the 'universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms.'" 79 Thus, under the UNPA,
enacted by Congress to bind the United States to the U.N. Charter, the
United States, and other states, have a treaty obligation to intervene
unilaterally when violations of international human rights law occur. Not
only is this argument a defense for United States unilateral intervention, it
also presents such intervention as a binding obligation.
76. U.N. CHARTER art. 27, § 3 (stating that,"[d]ecisions of the Security Council. .. shall
be made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members.") Id.
77. Byron F. Burmester, On Hwnanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and Wars
to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 269, 270 (1994) (Inferring that "[a] state that
employs force against another state will attempt to define its acts as being justified under the
Charter.")
78. Id. at 269 (claiming that the United States entered Somalia not at the request of the
U.N., but rather, after unilaterally volunteering, the U.N. quickly ratified the United States offer,
authorizing the newly formed multilateral force to use all means necessary.)
79. Burmester, supra note 77, at 275 (explaining articles 55 and 56 of the U.N.
CHARTER).
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A second strong defense for unilateral intervention arises from
what could be interpreted as a violating state's implied waiver of
sovereignty. If a state forfeits its sovereignty through human rights
abuses, and an intervening state is merely trying to eliminate the
violations, then the intervening state has not violated international law.
Critics may charge that this justification can be used by any aggressor state
trying to cloak the illegality of its intervention. Yet, subsequent actions
taken by the intervening state can demonstrate for itself the true nature of
the intervention.' International organizations, such as the U.N., can
choose to ratify the action or request that member states use multilateral
force to eject the intervening state. It is more practical to support swift
unilateral intervention to halt human rights violations, than to favor an
endless dialogue over motives, funding, and consequences.
VI. CONCLUSION
The codifications and precedents of the last fifty years have
provided strong authority that a state forfeits its sovereignty when
committing human rights abuses. Through international organizations,
treaties, and growing customary international law, states are learning that
sovereignty is no protective barrier for torture, rape, political
imprisonment, enslavement, and murder. The U.N. can provide a
powerful legitimacy in its authorization of intervention. However, the
United States remains the predominant enforcement power of both Security
Council Resolutions and of its own interest in preserving international
human rights. Elements in the United States Congress and elsewhere
should understand that the funding, military backing, and general support
of the United States in peacemaking operations is a vital deterrent against
international chaos. Indeed, preservation of international human rights law
is a more important United States interest than is the harm to international
stability that would ensue in a decline of respect for international human
rights law.
80. Id. at 284. "[I]t is not relevant that the United States justified intervention in Panama
by claims that General Noriega violated international drug laws. To the contrary, the United
States returned the lawfully elected government to office, thus demonstrating its altruistic motives
by its actions." Id.
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